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The objective of this study is to present a theoretical paper about a clinical issue. Our aim 
is to propose some clinical and semiological considerations for a psychopathological conception 
of psychopathy. We will discuss several major theoretical works dedicated to this nosographic 
entity (mainly those of Schneider, Cleckley and Hare). We will also examine a significant issue 
raised by Cooke et al., namely whether psychopathic functioning is consistently related to 
antisocial behavior. This theoretical essay is informed by clinical situations (involving 
psychopaths who were interviewed in prison or in forensic centers). The method applied a 
phenomenological psychopathology analysis to the clinical material. We first compare 
Binswanger’s conception of mania with psychopathic functioning. Patients’ behavior is similar 
but there is a difference related to the dialectic between the ego and the alter ego. A patient with 
mania has a fundamental crisis of the ego, which a psychopath does not have. A second finding 
of our investigations concerns emotions and the adaptive dimension of the psychopathic disorder. 
An epistemological discussion of the concept of emotions reveals that psychopaths are competent 
in the management of emotional stimuli, which confers a psychological advantage upon them.  
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As a discipline, phenomenological psychopathology has the objective of identifying the logical 
structure of psychological functioning; it favors an approach based on understanding over 
interpretation or explanation [1-3]. It aims to identify the specific psychological features inherent 
in nosographic entities. This method is part of the heritage of Minkowski [4-5], who suggested 
engaging in a “psychology of the pathological” rather than a “pathology of the psychological,” 
that is, seeking a structural understanding of psychological organization. This approach to 
psychopathology is based on two essential elements. First, the discipline is strongly influenced by 
philosophy – particularly phenomenology – and uses the contributions made by this body of 
knowledge to better understand psychopathological manifestations [6-8]. Second, 
phenomenological psychopathology is intrinsically clinical; the fundamentals of its research 
topics – phenomena – emerge from clinical practice [8-10]. 
This school of thought, which is becoming increasingly influential internationally, has 
traditionally examined primarily psychotic disorders, especially schizophrenia [11-14], but also 
melancholic depression [15-19] and manic crises [14,15,20]. Recently, some representatives of 
this school have begun investigating psychopathological entities that had previously been 
neglected, such as borderline personality [21] and anorexia nervosa [22-24]. 
The aim of this paper is to reflect on the psychological functioning of psychopathic subjects. No 
study of psychopathy inspired by this approach has yet appeared in the international literature. 
This article summarizes our own research, which has hitherto been published only in French 
[8,25-26]. 
We will discuss two major theoretical works dedicated to this nosographic entity. One is German: 
Schneider’s Psychopathic Personalities [27]. The other is American: Cleckley’s The Mask of 
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Sanity [28]. We will then summarize the well-known work of Hare [29] including the so-called 
Hare Psychopathy Checklist (PCL-R), as well as the critique made by Cooke et al. [30-33]. 
Next, we will show a phenomenological-structural approach enhances the psychopathological 
investigation of psychopathy. In order to do a semiological comparison, we will base ourselves 
on Binswanger’s work on mania [34]. Emotion and the adaptive dimension of psychopathy will 




Psychopathy was described in the early nineteenth century by Pinel, who observed that some 
subjects presented “mania without madness.” This early description is very important as it will 
enable us to explain the problem inherent in modern conceptions of psychopathy. The work of 
Schneider [27] and Cleckley [28] gradually led to a common and still current definition of 
psychopathy: a serious disorder or imbalance of the character or personality that does not include 
psychosis or significant mental deficiency (see Table 1). 
In contemporary nosographic work, psychopathy occupies an ambiguous position. This 
uncertainty is reflected in its absence from the DSM-IV [35] and DSM-5 [36]. Despite the lack of 
a definition in the international classifications, an important movement in the literature has the 
objective of formulating a pragmatic definition of psychopathy, based on the work of Hare [29]. 
The Hare Psychopathy Checklist – Revised (PCL-R) presents a set of behavioral, interpersonal 
and affective characteristics, including egocentricity; manipulation; insensitivity to others; 
irresponsibility; unstable relationships; impulsivity; lack of empathy, remorse or guilt; and poor 
behavioral control (see Table 1). These signs are most likely to be manifested in antisocial 
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behavior [34-35]. These antisocial characteristics are part of the clinical picture, but they are not 
sufficient for a diagnosis of psychopathy: a psychopathic subject necessarily has an antisocial 
personality, but the opposite is not necessarily true [29,37]. According to this conception, one 
might consider the psychopathic personality to be a way of adapting to the world through 
affective and interpersonal experiences, whereas the antisocial dimension is primarily a set of 
behaviors involving transgressions against social laws and standards. 
 
Table 1. Summary of criteria for psychopathy 
 
This work adds a specific set of items to the diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder in order 
to isolate psychopathy as a specific nosographic entity; these items mainly concern the 
interpersonal sphere and the affective dimension. We will now discuss Cooke et al.’s [30-33] 
criticism of the PCL-R’s factor structure, and particularly the presence of antisocial 
characteristics in the diagnosis of psychopathy. 
Cooke et al.’s work stimulated a lively debate on whether antisocial behaviors are or are not 
necessary in characterizing a subject as a psychopath [38-39]. This ambiguity had already existed 
in the work of Schneider [27] and Cleckley [28]. However, Cleckley was the researcher who 
seemed most clearly to envisage the possibility of a diagnosis of psychopathy without the 
presence of antisocial or illegal behavior [28,38]. 
The Comprehensive Assessment of Psychopathic Personality (CAPP) [30-33] defends a different 
basis for defining the psychopathic entity. This conception, which is also deeply influenced by 
Cleckley’s work, is a multidimensional model of personality that consists in six dimensions, 
including each of the dysfunctional traits observed in psychopathic personality disorder (see 
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Table 1), excluding the antisocial factor (and those related to sexual promiscuity and short-term 
cohabitation relationships in the PCL-R). These authors consider the antisocial factor to 
constitute “secondary symptoms,” which follow from the psychopathic lifestyle. Thus, the model 
excludes the elements related to the subject’s behavioral and criminal history. According to this 
criticism, the interpersonal and affective facets are the “central constituents” of the psychopathic 
personality.  
We should make it clear that we are not aiming to present a comprehensive examination of all 
contemporary models of psychopathy. In particular, we are referring here to the Psychopathic 
Personality Inventory [40-42] and the Triarchic psychopathy model [43].The former was revised 
in 2005 to become the PPI-R and now comprises 154 items organized into eight subscales [40]. 
The items are grouped into two overarching and largely separate factors (Factor 1 – Fearless 
dominance: Social influence, Fearlessness, Stress immunity; Factor 2 – Impulsive antisociality: 
Machiavellian egocentricity, Rebellious nonconformity, Blame externalization, Carefree 
nonplanfulness), plus a third factor that is mainly dependent on scores on the other two (Cold-
heartedness). 
Meanwhile, the Triarchic model [43] suggests that different conceptions of psychopathy 
emphasize three observable characteristics to varying degrees: Boldness (low fear including 
stress -tolerance, toleration of unfamiliarity and danger, and high self-confidence and social 
assertiveness), Disinhibition (poor impulse control, including problems with planning and 
foresight, lacking affect and urge control, demand for immediate gratification, and poor 
behavioral restraints), and Meanness (Lacking empathy and close attachments with others, 
disdain of close attachments, use of cruelty to gain empowerment, exploitative tendencies, 
defiance of authority, and destructive excitement seeking). 
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These developments are very important and allow one to go a step farther in understanding the 
psychopathic individual’s psychology, but they still seem to stop short of one crucial step: 
carrying out an in-depth psychopathological study of psychopathy. We will formulate our critical 
discussion on the basis of the PCL-R alone, as it remains the reference tool in criminological and 
psychopathological assessments in the field of forensics. 
 
A Psychopathological View of Psychopathy 
Our objective is to seek out the meaning structure and the meaning that links different signs of 
the disorder. According to Jaspers’ proposal [2,3,44], the objective in psychopathology is to 
understand the puzzle that is presented, observe the phenomena, and seek to obtain a significant 
overall picture1. We propose to start this approach, paradoxically, by examining manic being-in-
the-world. 
 
A Paradoxical Starting Point: Binswanger’s Ego and Alter Ego in Manic Subjects 
Ludwig Binswanger [34] conducted a systematic analysis of the “reification of the alter ego” in 
manic subjects. One of the fundamental characteristics of mania, in this author’s view, is seeing 
other people as “interchangeable” and “utilitarian.” Although Binswanger does not address this 
question, we can make an analogy with psychopathic functioning, which also presents this 
tendency to reify others. 
Comments by psychopathic subjects about other people: “My colleagues at work were 
objects I used when I needed them; in my eyes, they were no more than that”; “This 
person tried to enter into my life and I’d never asked anything of her – she didn’t exist for 
                                                             
1 In this paper, we will not discuss the numerous theoretical contributions made by psychoanalysis. 
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me. She embarrassed me and I told her so. She insisted and we got into an argument… I 
didn’t actually do it, but I could have killed her”; “What counts for me is the pleasure I 
get from what I’m doing; the role of other people isn’t very important”; “I wanted to 
bring off a successful robbery and no man was going to stop me. To succeed, I killed 
him… I had to kill him… He didn’t represent anything more than an obstacle to me.” 
[Source: own clinical experience. The subjects whose comments are presented here were 
diagnosed by a multidisciplinary team including a psychologist and a psychiatrist in a 
forensic center. All of the subjects had committed crimes and presented significant 
antisocial characteristics. The eight subjects in this clinical sample were tested with the 
PCL-R and obtained scores of between 27 and 34 (mean = 30.25).]  
Clearly, though, from a clinical perspective, mania and psychopathy are very different 
phenomena. In what ways? When Pinel describes psychopathic behavior as “mania without 
madness,” it is important to define what is meant by “madness.” The work of Binswanger [34] 
presents “the constitution of the alter ego” and “the ego” as a basis for discussing the 
dysfunctions of manic being-in-the-world. His thesis is that, in manic subjects, a disorder 
affecting the constitution of the alter ego coexists with a disorder of the constitution of the ego, or 
I: “If in mania the alter ego is not completely constituted, and thus remains largely a stranger, or 
even a strange thing – a mere object taken, pushed aside and rejected, used and consumed by 
something – then the causes are naturally not in the alter ego but in the ego” [34, p. 93, our 
translation]. 
This observation is critical since it presents mania as a subclass of psychosis, which Binswanger 
considers, based on Husserl’s work, as a failure of “appresentation” [Appräsentation]. When two 
people meet, “what is present to us is different but is accompanied by the same appresentation” 
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[34, p. 75, our translation]. These two people share a set of common representations that allow 
them to consider each other as an alter ego and to share a common world. Thus, in Binswanger’s 
understanding of the term,2 appresentation is an intersubjective, intuitive and precognitive 
phenomenon that enables one to form relationships and that must necessarily be shared by the 
various partners. A priori it is crucial for the sharing of common meaning and natural self-
evidence in social exchanges. It is precisely this faculty that is said to be deficient in psychotic 
pathologies (including mania). 
Binswanger cites the example of one of his manic patients, Elsa Strauss, who entered a church 
and interrupted the ceremony to compliment the pianist and ask him for private lessons, 
offending the whole congregation. Words and actions, taken out of context, are not 
fundamentally incoherent or delirious, but they show a “failure of appresentation in mania and 
(…) the impossibility of constituting a common world” [34, p. 78, our translation]. The essence 
of psychosis in Binswanger’s view is to escape this implicit common appresentation. This thesis 
can be superimposed on modern concepts of psychosis according to phenomenological 
psychopathology [11-14]. According to Binswanger, the manic reification of the other and the 
problem affecting the alter ego can be situated in a disorder affecting a psychotic ego. The 
determining factor in discriminating between manic and psychopathic subjects is at this level: the 
former have a disorder of the constitution of the alter ego explained by a disorder of the ego, 
while the latter have the same disorder but with an intact ego. 
 
                                                             
2 Binswanger’s definition of Husserl’s concept is open to criticism. As we will see, Binswanger gives priority to the 
intersubjective dimension of this phenomenon, whereas for Husserl [45] appresentation has a more inclusive 
meaning and consists in the tendency to make a phenomenon that is inaccessible to direct perception available to 
consciousness. Note that Binswanger is strongly influenced by Szilasi’s [46] interpretation of Husserl’s work and 
makes use of Szilasi’s examples when he evokes the complex nature of apperception. 
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Reification of others without an ego-related disorder as a core feature of psychopathy 
The major difference between manic and psychopathic reification of the other is clearly 
identifiable for clinicians. For manic patients, other people are just a casual means of 
implementing their own projects, of enjoying themselves or their grandiosity. Their 
instrumentalization of others is direct, clearly prereflexive , even “naïve”. They do not even try to 
imagine what goes on in other people’s minds, because this does not play a role in their projects. 
Their empathetic awareness of other people is nonexistent. In contrast, for psychopaths, other 
people are a means of gaining power and pursuing their goals in a cold, insidious way. Their 
instrumentalization of others has a reflective, well-thought-out component, which is somewhat 
“Machiavellian”. They may well use imagination and “theory of mind” in order to deceive, lie 
and misuse others to achieve their own ends. 
Thanks to Binswanger’s analysis of the crisis of the ego and the alter ego, we can refine this 
description. The radical and fundamental difference between manic and psychopathic subjects is 
that the latter do not present problems with the ego or I; to put it more simply, they do not have 
psychotic symptoms. A psychopath presents a disorder affecting the alter ego, via the reification 
of others (a symptom shared with manic subjects) but without presenting an ego-related disorder 
(a symptom not shared with manic subjects). Unlike a manic subject, a psychopath is able to 
maintain a stable ego and a coherent identity while still reifying others. For the psychopath, the 
alter ego problem is not secondary to a problem with the ego in its function as an appresentative 
structure. 
Now let us reconsider the 20 items of the PCL-R. Based on the recommendations of the CAPP 
[30-373], we will eliminate the so-called secondary items, which are less relevant to our 
psychopathological approach. The remaining 13 items are as follows: 1. Glibness and/or 
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superficial charm; 2. Grandiose sense of self-worth; 3. Need for stimulation and/or proneness to 
boredom; 4. Pathological lying; 5. Conning and/or manipulative; 6. Lack of remorse or guilt; 7. 
Shallow affect; 8. Callous and/or lack of empathy; 9. Parasitic lifestyle; 13. Lack of realistic, 
long-term goals; 14. Impulsivity; 15. Irresponsibility; 16. Failure to accept responsibility for own 
actions. 
The semiological picture presented above describes manic subjects just as well as psychopaths. 
Needless to say, we do not think these two diagnostic entities are the same. Because it limits its 
analyses to a survey of interpersonal and affective dimensions considered as isolable signs, and 
does not provide a structural and psychopathological synthesis, this model is unable to explain 
the difference between mania and psychopathy. 
Still, we should not be surprised by this finding in light of Pinel’s proposal to consider 
psychopathy as “mania without madness.” Our overview of Binswanger’s work has revealed that 
the difference between mania and psychopathy is located not at the level of psychological signs 
but at the psychopathological level, based on the dialectic between the alter ego and the ego. 
 
Psychopathy, Emotion and Adaptation 
Maladaptation? 
One of the problems in understanding psychopathy may be immediately considering it as a 
disorder [2], without further thought, and thus viewing it a priori as a maladaptation. For 
evolutionary psychopathology [47-52], many behaviors considered to be pathological must have 
an adaptive value in the original environment in which the morphology and psychology of our 
species were shaped. A change in time (a behavior in another era) or space (a behavior in another 
context, or social, cultural or economic situation) may make a symptom appear adaptive (e.g., 
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anorexia nervosa in times of famine). Concerning psychopathy, one might suggest that “The 
social function of psychopaths depends on conditions in the environment. In times of peace, we 
lock them up; in times of war, we count on them and cover them with medals” [51, p. 29, our 
translation]. 
Classically [26-28], psychopathy is associated with a general or specific emotional deficit, 
affecting the processing and production of emotion. Basic research tends to partially disconfirm 
this hypothesis [53-56]. Although the emotional dimension is considered to be the basis for the 
process of adaptation and social interaction and is assumed to have a regulating function [8,57-
59], the hypothesis that psychopaths have an emotional deficit is contradictory. We suggest 
instead that psychopaths are able to understand and manage emotional phenomena. This 
conception is in opposition to the “poor,” “narrow” and “immature” emotional life attributed to 
psychopaths [27-29]. It corresponds to the adaptive conception envisaged by Demaret [51] (The 
psychopath does not suddenly regain emotional competence in times of war that he had lost in 
times of peace.) This conception is very coherent with clinical findings: 
“I can say that I understand other people well; I know how they react… Based on the way 
they look and their attitude, I know how I need to react”; “I knew how to act with my 
victims. First, I took time to observe them and, when I understood how they reacted, I knew 
if I could or couldn’t steal from them. Once I had decided, nothing could stop me any 
more – their reactions were of no importance… I decided not to attach any importance to 
them – it would have put me at a disadvantage…”; “You know, my apparent coldness that 
I’m so often reproached for doesn’t mean that I’m unaware of other people around me… 
But I don’t show it. I’ve often noticed that it’s more profitable like that.” 




“Emotional coldness” must be differentiated from “emotional deficit.” Emotional coldness, if we 
can agree on a definition, is clearly one of the fundamental clinical signs of psychopathy. Hare 
[29] defines emotional coldness as one of the four facets of psychopathy (and thus an essential 
trait). We are in agreement with this claim. He then defines it with four items: Lack of remorse or 
guilt (item 6), Shallow affect (item 7), Callous and/or lack of empathy (item 8) and Failure to 
accept responsibility for own actions (item 16). This second point is not satisfactory because 
Hare’s definition does not perfectly delimit the concept. Emotional coldness should instead be 
considered as a way of managing emotional manifestations calmly and coolly, without 
precipitation. (This is difficult to relate to item 14 of the PCL-R, “impulsivity,” which describes 
antisocial subjects but not true psychopaths, strictly speaking.) Emotional coldness is a preferred 
method of managing emotion calmly and keeping some distance, as well as a tendency to take the 
time to analyze the emotional experiences that are triggered (in oneself or in others). This 
tendency should not be considered as being more or less adaptive, effective or pathological than a 
“warm” emotion management style (tendency to react faster, by trial and error, “naturally” or 
“romantically”). We suggest that it is probably more profitable to have a preferred method (a 
style) of emotion management than to manage emotion in a more random, less coherent way. 
Depending on an individual’s social, relational or professional situation, it may be more adaptive 
to manage emotion either “coldly” (political leader, emergency physician, etc.) or “warmly” 
(group facilitator, performing artist, etc.). That means that the emotional coldness generally 
attributed to psychopaths may be considered partly as an adaptive advantage, which can also be 




Empathy and Sympathy 
Psychopaths are generally said to have an empathy deficit [60-61]. Once again, it is necessary to 
define this concept. If we examine the definition more closely, we can see that a psychopath does 
not actually have an empathy disorder but a sympathy disorder. This difference is crucial as it 
enables us to distinguish between psychopathy (sympathy disorder) and schizophrenia (empathy 
disorder). 
The concept of empathy is evoked so often that researchers often forget to define and analyze it. 
Reflections from philosophy show us that empathy is actually a phenomenon that is very difficult 
to delimit, and when closely examined, complicated to define [62-65]. The most widely accepted 
definition can be summarized in this way: it is the psychological mechanism whereby an 
individual manages to intuitively represent another person’s emotional experience or suffering. In 
this definition, the concept of empathy does not consider the subject’s response to this 
representation. It is therefore an representational ability” that allows for “understanding of 
others.” It can be differentiated from sympathy, the object of which is other people’s well-being 
[63,66,67]. Empathy is related to intuitive, implicit understanding and knowledge. Sympathy 
involves compassion and attention to others’ well-being. 
Empathetic knowledge is not “intellectual.” Rather, it is a kind of intuitive, implicit knowledge 
that arises immediately when we meet another person. This is a primary form of intersubjectivity 
to (immediate) perception of another person’s emotional state, based on bodily expression and 
intercorporeality. This “implicit empathy” underlies social exchanges [8,14]. In addition to this 
prereflexive tendency, psychopathologists develop a method of understanding other people’s 
experiences. This “conative empathy” is a reflexive and explicit practice used to promote the 
development of intersubjectivity between the clinician and the patient. We will not go into detail 
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on conative empathy in this article (in this regard, see [8,14,63-65]). In the clinical setting, we 
can therefore distinguish between two “kinds” of empathy: the clinician’s (empathy with a 
methodological aim – conative and explicit) and the patient’s (empathy with a diagnostic aim – 
implicit). 
The investigation of implicit empathy needs to go into more depth in the case of psychopathy. A 
disorder affecting empathy (considered as the faculty of representing other people’s experiences 
at the emotional, sentimental or cognitive level) leads to a diagnosis of schizophrenia, rather than 
psychopathy. From this point of view, we must formally reconsider the hypothesis that 
psychopaths are affected by an empathy deficiency. On the other hand, it seems very possible that 
they have a “sympathy disorder.” A psychopath has no difficulty identifying other people’s 
feelings and experiences (unlike a person with schizophrenia), but he finds them completely 
unimportant, as is other people’s well-being. The analysis of other people and their experiences is 
strictly utilitarian and is unrelated to concern for or attention to their well-being. For example, a 
psychopath can describe his victims’ suffering (showing evidence of empathy) but can coldly 
explain that they are of no importance to him (he feels no sympathy). Generally, psychopaths 
know that other people are bundles of emotions but they never “lose themselves” in this affective 
experience: 
A psychopathic rapist is asked about his victims: “What do you want me to say? That won’t 
change anything for them. Maybe it did hurt them, but how do you expect that to change 
things for me? … What I think now won’t change anything about their situations or mine”; 
“I can well understand when other people want to express their feelings but it’s nothing to 
do with me. What other people feel isn’t important to me”; “Honestly, I don’t understand 
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my victims. If I were in their place, I’d forget about it and stop getting all worked up about 
what I did to them.” 
[Source: own clinical experience] 
This sympathy disorder, which takes the form of being able to imagine other people’s emotional 




The purpose of this paper was to examine psychopathy and the classical approaches to evaluating 
it with the methods of phenomenological psychopathology. Despite some behavioral similarities, 
our analysis made it possible to distinguish between mania and psychopathy, to restore to 
psychopathy the emotional competence it had been considered not to have, and to differentiate 
between empathy and sympathy. The adaptive qualities that have been preserved, consistently 
with the mastery of empathy, do not preclude a moral disorder via the loss of sympathy for other 
people. Finally, our study enabled us to identify a fundamental structural characteristic of 
psychopathy, namely the ability to reify other people and to keep one’s own ego intact. 
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